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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant/appellant was charged following his arrest 
by an information filed on October 21, 1980, in the Fifth 
Circuit Court with the offense of possession of controlled 
substances with intent to distribute. The probable cause 
statement, supporting the information, contained an allega-
tion that the defendant had sold controlled substances to an 
unnamed person several days prior to his being found in 
possession and arrested. (R-86-87). 
The defendant made a motion to the circuit court for 
return of currency seized from his home at the time of his 
arrest. (R-81-82). The attorney for the State, Deputy 
County Attorney M. Christensen, represented to the circuit 
court that the currency was material evidence going to the 
intent to distribute because it included some currency from 
the prior, uncharged, sale to the unnamed person. The 
circuit court, accepting that representation, denied the mo-
tion for return of that property. The defendant also moved 
the circuit court for a discovery order regarding the particu-
lars of the alleged prior sale, including the name of the 
person allegedly buying the drugs. (R-10-11). The State 
objected on the basis that the person was a "confidential 
informant." The circuit court, relying again on the represen-
tation of the prosecutor concerning the materiality of the 
prior, uncharged, sale and the allegations concerning the 
sale contained in the probable cause statement of the informa-
tion, found that the person "making the buy" was not a 
"confidential informant" within the meaning of then appli-
cable Rule 36, Utah Rules of Evidence and ordered the sought 
discovery. Findings and Order, November 7, 1980. (R-4-, 
77-79). At the same time the circuit court ordered the 
preliminary hearing, which had been set for November 18, 
1980, continued to December 16, 1980. (R-4-). 
The County Attorney then filed a collateral action for 
extraordinary relief in the district court against Circuit 
Court Judge Larry Keller and the defendant herein seeking to 
set aside the discovery order and obtained, ex parte, an 
order staying all proceedings in the circuit court pending 
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the outcome of the collateral action. Cannon v. Keller, 3rd 
Dist. Ct. No. Misc. 80-88, Order of Nov. 12, 1980. (R-72). 
On December 16, 1980, the date set for preliminary hearing, 
the circuit court ordered "hearing continued without date. 
(See order in file)." (R-4). 
The collateral civil proceeding was finally disposed of 
on October 25, 1984, by a unanimous decision of this Honor-
able Court upholding the validity of the circuit court's 
discovery order. Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984). 
On January 14, 1985, the circuit court, on motion of the 
prosecutor, set the preliminary hearing for February 7, 1985. 
On February 7, 1985, the defendant moved to dismiss the 
information, because of the denial of a prompt preliminary 
hearing and because the prosecutor had still failed to comply 
with the discovery order. (Agreed statement supplementing 
record). The circuit court denied those motions, once again 
ordered the prosecutor to furnish the discovery, setting a 
deadline of February 8, 1985, and, on its own motion, contin-
ued the preliminary hearing to February 14, 1985. (R-4-5). 
On February 14, 1985, four and a third years after the 
arrest of the defendant, the circuit court heard evidence, 
made a finding of probable cause, and bound the defendant 
over to the district court for arraignment. (R-5). 
In the district court, the defendant made a timely 
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motion to quash the information because of the delay in 
conducting a preliminary hearing in violation of Rule 7, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, (R-80-90), and a motion to 
dismiss, with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 25 (b)(1), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, because the delay in bringing 
the defendant to trial was in violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and Section 12, Arti-
cle I of the Constitution of Utah, and such delay was 
unreasonable and the statute of limitations, Section 76-1-302 
(a), U.C.A., had run. (R-103). 
Those motions were denied after hearing by the trial 
court, (R-95). The defendant was brought to trial on April 
23, 1985, (R-96) and convicted on April 29, 1985. (R-98). 
The defendant was fined and sentenced to prison but was 
released on bail pending this appeal. (R-202-203). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The fifty-one month delay which resulted from the County 
Attorney staying the instant prosecution while he unsuccess-
fully litigated a collateral civil action violated the defen-
dant's right to a prompt preliminary hearing and his right to 
a speedy trial. 
Rule 7(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a 
preliminary hearing within thirty days where a defendant is 
not in custody unless the time period is extended by the 
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magistrate for good cause. Here the preliminary hearing was 
continued without date for over four years. 
The purpose of Rule 7 is to protect against the infringe-
ment of liberty for any longer than necessary without a 
determination by a magistrate as to the existence of probable 
cause for the accusation. The proper remedy for the failure 
to conduct the preliminary examination is to dismiss the 
information, without prejudice, and discharge the defendant. 
However, in this case, the statute of limitations has run so 
that the dismissal would be effectively with prejudice. 
The determination of a claim of denial of speedy trial 
involves the balancing of four, interconnected factors: the 
length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, whether the 
defendant asserted the right and the extent of prejudice. 
The delay in this case, over four years, was so extreme 
as to raise a presumption of prejudice and a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
While a necessary and meritorious interlocutory appeal 
might justify some delay, the prosecution has to weigh the 
need for interrupting the prosecution against the defendant's 
speedy trial claim and to be diligent in minimizing any delay. 
In the instant case, the prosecutor had numerous alterna-
tives to bringing a collateral action which he could have 
chosen without prejudice to any legitimate concern of the 
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state. This Court found the County Attorney's arguments in 
the collateral action to be without merit. Furthermore, the 
collateral action was pursued with a remarkable absence of 
diligence. 
Because the prosecutor obtained, £x parte, a stay of all 
proceedings prior to the preliminary hearing, the defendant 
was precluded from demanding a trial until after disposition 
of the collateral action. The defendant asserted his demand 
as soon as he was able to do so. 
A defendant need not show that the delay hindered his 
defense or that there would have been a different result 
without the delay. The right to a speedy trial is specific-
ally guaranteed by the Constitution and protects different 
interests than the right to a fair trial. The prejudice 
suffered by the defendant arises from the restriction on 
liberty, anxiety, disruption of life plan and interference 
with economic and social activity. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I - THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION WHERE THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
WAS NOT HELD UNTIL FOUR YEARS AFTER THE TIME REQUIRED BY RULE. 
At the outset, the right to a prompt determination of 
probable cause at a preliminary hearing must be distinguished 
from the right to a speedy trial. The requirements of Rule 
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7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure seek to protect different 
interests, involve different tests and, ordinarily, their 
protection involves different sanctions than the speedy trial 
requirements enforceable through Rule 25. As stated in State 
v. Stoeckle, 164 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Wis. 1969): 
It appears that the purpose of Sec. 954.05(1), 
Stats., is not necessarily to protect a defendant's 
right to a speedy trial, but rather to limit the 
period of time a person accused of crime must be 
detained or incarcerated on the basis of an arrest 
warrant alone. The statute simply requires that 
within a relatively short period of time after arrest, 
an accused has the right to have a magistrate deter-
mine whether there is sufficient probable cause to 
bind him over for trial. If the state delays the pre-
liminary hearing beyond the statutory time limit with-
out the defendant's consent, this court in Klinkiewicz 
held that the charge must be dismissed and the defen-
dant released, although he may be recharged if the 
statute of limitations has not run. 
And in People v. Weston, 319 N.W.2d 537, 539, (Mich. 1982): 
The analysis of a speedy trial issue in which the 
relief granted is the defendant's discharge and a bar 
to further prosecution is far difference from the 
analysis here in which the relief to be granted is 
the defendant's discharge without a bar to further 
prosecution. . . . 
A preliminary examination functions, in part, as a 
a screening device to insure that there is a basis 
for holding a defendant to face a criminal charge. 
A defendant against whom there is insufficient evi-
dence to proceed should be cleared and released as 
soon as possible. The notion that a presumptively 
innocent defendant should remain in custody until a 
convenient time arrives for the magistrate to conduct 
the preliminary examination is exactly what the Legis-
lature precluded in M.C.L. §766.0; M.S.A. §28.9191. 
The Utah rule requiring a prompt preliminary hearing, 
Rule 7(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: 
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(c) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he 
shall not be called on to plead before the committing 
magistrate. During the initial appearance before the 
magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of his 
right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant 
waives his right to a preliminary examination, and 
the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate 
shall forthwith order the defendant bound over to 
answer in the district court. If the defendant does 
not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate 
shall schedule the preliminary examination. Such 
examination shall be held within a reasonable time, 
but in any event not later than ten days if the defen-
dant is in custody for the offense charged and not 
later than 30 days if he is not in custody; provided, 
however, that these time periods may be extended by 
the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary 
examination shall not be held if the defendant is 
indicted. 
The rule requires that the preliminary hearing be held 
"within a reasonable time," and then goes on to set specific 
time limits of ten days for a defendant in custody, and thirty 
days, for a defendant not in custody. 
It is clear that the drafters of the rule intended that 
persons charged with serious crimes had the right to have a 
neutral magistrate inquire into the existance of probable 
cause to support the charge promptly to justify the contin-
uing infringement of liberty and other burdens upon the 
defendant. 
A defendant under accusation suffers anxiety, public obloquy, 
disruption of his earning ability, and drain on his financial re-
sources, in addition to curtailment of his freedom of movement and 
association. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 27 (1973). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has considered alleged violations 
of Rule 7(c) on two occasions on appeal following conviction. 
In State v. Bradshaw, 680 P.2d, 1036, 104-0-41 (Utah 
1984) , the Court found that the rule was not abused by a 
delay of 170 days after arrest resulting from continuances 
because of changes in defense counsel and the defendant's 
failure to appear in court. In State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026 
(Utah 1982) the Court found the time limits inapplicable, 
because of specific language in the rule, to a situation 
where the defendant first waived preliminary hearing and then 
had the case remanded for preliminary hearing. It is note-
worthy that this Court ruled on the merits in these cases 
rather than dismissing the Rule 7(c) arguments on the grounds 
that the rule is directory only, or that any violation would 
be harmless error. 
While some state courts have held that violation of the right 
to a prompt preliminary hearing does not preclude later 
proceedings, e.g., State v. Wrightsil, 474 P.2d 470 (Ariz. 
1970), it is submitted that the more carefully reasoned 
approach is to hold that a person can only be subjected to 
the jurisdiction of the magistrate for the time specified 
without a hearing and thereafter a new information and war-
rant must be sought. See, Landrum v. Superior Court, 634 
P.2d 352 (Cal. 1981)(In bank); State v. Stoeckle, supra; 
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People v. Weston, supra. 
Until a preliminary hearing is held, a criminal accusa-
tion resembles a temporary restraining order in a civil case 
the warrant has been obtained ex parte and the rules 
require an adversary hearing promptly to protect important 
constitutional rights. The indefinite continuance of a crimi-
nal case, prior to preliminary hearing, to await the outcome 
of collateral litigation cannot be justified, particularly 
where the alternative, a dismissal without prejudice, is 
reasonable. 
In the instant case, if it were necessary to pursue the 
collateral litigation (a matter the defendant disputes in 
Point II of this argument), the proper course would have been 
to dismiss the information in the instant case and seek 
declaratory relief. The alternative was to deprive a citizen 
of his liberty for years without any judicial review as to 
whether there was probable cause to believe him guilty of an 
offense while the county attorney sought to resolve a dispute 
with the magistrate which was collateral to the issue of 
guilt or innocence. 
In this case, the delay extended beyond the four year 
statute of limitations, §76-1-302, U.C.A,, so that the matter 
could not have been refiled and the dismissal would have been 
effectively with prejudice. However, it is submitted that 
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that is a highly unusual occurance. Given reasonable dili-
gence, absent in the collateral action in this instance, an 
extraordinary relief application can be pursued through the 
Supreme Court in less than four years. The statute of 
limitations provides a useful stimulas to the prosecutor to 
pursue collateral litigation with diligence. 
Even if it were to be accepted that the pursuit of 
collateral litigation is good cause for a continuance under 
Rule 7, that determination should be made by the magistrate 
and for a specified time period. Regardless, there was 
absolutely no excuse for the last continuance which was 
caused by the failure of the prosecutor to comply with the 
discovery order months after this Court had held the order a 
valid exercise of the Circuit Court's powers. 
POINT II: THE DELAY OF OVER FOUR YEARS IN BRINGING APPELLANT TO 
TRIAL CAUSED BY THE PROSECUTOR'S UNNECESSARY COLLATERAL ACTION 
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. 
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514- (1972), the United States 
Supreme Court set out the criteria to be applied in 
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determining if a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to speedy 
trial has been infringed. The court rejected the "demand -
waiver doctrine" which required the defendant to demand trial 
before any time period was to be counted as "inconsistant 
with this Court's pronouncements on waiver of constitutional 
rights." 407 U.S. at 525, 529. The Court instead proceeded 
to adopt a balancing test which identified "the factors which 
courts should assess in determining whether a particular 
defendant has been deprived of his right," as: (1) the 
length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) 
whether and when the defendant asserted his speedy trial 
right, and (4-) the extent of the prejudice to the defendant. 
We regard none of the four factors identified 
above as either a necessary or sufficient condition 
to the finding of a deprivation of the right of 
speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and 
must be considered together with such other circum-
stances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors 
have no talismanic qualities; courts must still en-
gage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. 
But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right 
of the accused, this process must be carried out with 
full recognition that the accused's interest in a 
speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Consti-
tution. 
407 U.S. at 533. (Footnote Omitted). 
1. THE LENGTH OF THE DELAY 
While the Supreme Court declined to set any particular 
time period which triggers a presumption of unreasonable 
delay, one authority examining the application of the test by 
lower courts has concluded that: 
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Any delay of eight months or longer is "pre-
sumptively prejudicial." . . .[T]here is apparent 
consensus that delay of less than five months is . . . 
insufficiently "prejudicial" to trigger further con-
stitutional inquiry. . . . There is judicial disagree-
ment as to the six to seven month range, the majority 
holding a delay of this length "presumptively preju-
dicial. " 
Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48 Fordham L. 
Rev. 611, 623, n.71 (1980). Suffice it to say that the 
fifty-four month delay which occurred in this case is more 
than sufficient to raise a presumption of a denial of speedy-
trial. [The time is computed from actual arrest or the 
filing of formal indictment or information, whichever occurs 
first. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971)]. 
The United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 
supra, noted that the length of delay which may be justifi-
able is related to the nature of the case. "To take but one 
example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary 
street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex 
conspiracy charge." 407 U.S. at 431. The instant case 
involved the proof of the simplest of street crimes, requir-
ing less than a day to try. 
2. THE REASON FOR THE DELAY 
Of the fifty-four months between the arrest and the 
trial in the instant case, fifty-one months were consumed 
while the prosecutor stayed the criminal prosecution and 
litigated, in a collateral action, the validity of the cir-
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cuit court's discovery order. 
Although the pursuit of meritorious and necessary inter-
locutory appeals by the government has been held to justify 
reasonable delay, United States v. Herman, 576 F.2d 1139 (5th 
Cir. 1978); United States v. Bishton, 4-63 F.2d 887 (D.C.Cir. 
1972); State v. Pearce, 336 So.2d 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1976), the prosecutor's collateral action to overturn the 
discovery order here was unnecessary, lacking in merit and 
not pursued diligently. 
Appeals by the prosecution in criminal cases are limited 
by Rule 26(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to: 
(1) From a final judgment of dismissal; 
(2) From an order arresting judgment; 
(3) From an order terminating the prosecution 
because of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of 
a speedy trial; 
(4) From a judgment of the court holding a 
statute or any part thereof invalid; or 
(5) From an order of the court granting a pre-
trial motion to suppress evidence when, upon a peti-
tion for review, the supreme court decides that such 
an appeal would be in the interest of justice. 
The limiting of interlocutory appeals to the appeal of sup-
pression orders and only where the appellate court determines 
the appeal to be in the interest of justice reflects an 
intention to avoid the delay of trial on the merits. The 
prosecution avoided the strictures of the rule by bringing a 
separate action for extra-ordinary relief against the circuit 
judge and the defendant. 
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It is not contended that the prosecution is never justi-
fied in staying a criminal action and seeking extraordinary 
relief, but that such action is frought with danger to the 
speedy trial right because it takes the prosecution out of 
the normal flow of the criminal process, precludes the defen-
dant from asserting his speedy trial demand and involves 
other parties and collateral issues. See, State v. Jenkins, 
565 P.2d 759 (Ore. 1977). 
The prosecutor had clear alternatives to the drastic 
course pursued in this case. As this Court observed in its 
decision in the collateral case, the prosecutor could have 
chosen to return the money seized from the defendant and 
thereby removed the predicate for the discovery order. 
Cannon v. Keller, 692 P. 2d 740, 742, n.3 (Utah 1984). The 
dilemma of the prosecutor was of his own making as he sought 
to maintain the inconsistent claims of the materiality of the 
money and the non-materiality of its source. Ibid. The 
collateral action was brought not to protect the "informant," 
but to permit the state to keep property from the defendant 
for as long as possible. 
The prosecutor could have refused to comply with the 
discovery order without any adverse consequences to his case. 
The sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order is 
the suppression of the evidence sought to be discovered 
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evidence which the prosecutor claimed he did not intend to 
use. See, Cannon v. Keller, supra, at 74-3. 
It is important that the prosecution "made no factual 
showing respecting harm resulting from disclosure either at 
the hearing on the discovery order, Ibid. , 740 P. 2d at 743, 
or at the hearing on the motion to dismiss in the district 
court below. 
At the trial below, the "informant" testified that he 
was not contacted regarding whether he had a desire to remain 
anonymous following the date of the alleged purchase (T-166, 
R-416) and that he "didn't know why they didn't do it [reveal 
his identity] a long time ago," (T-168, R-418). It is 
apparent that the prosecutor made no effort to determine if 
there was any reason why he should not simply comply with the 
discovery order and reveal the informant's identity. 
The merit of the collateral action has been addressed by 
this Court in its decision on the matter which characterized 
the county attorney's argument as "attenuated." Cannon v. 
Keller, supra at 742. That case was clearly neither "close" 
nor did it involve novel questions that needed to be settled. 
Even if the state had a right and a need to appeal, the 
exercise of the right must be balanced against the defen-
dant's right to a speedy trial. In State v. Jenkins, 565 
P.2d 758 (Ore. 1977), the court upheld a dismissal for lack 
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of speedy trial where the state had spent eighteen months 
pursuing a statutory right to review by mandamus a judge's 
refusal to recuse himself. 
In the instant case, regardless of the necessity for, or 
the merits of, the collateral action, fifty-one months is far 
too long to spend on a collateral issue. It is submitted 
that the matter could have been settled easily within half 
that time with reasonable diligence on the part of the 
prosecutor. The county attorney was seven months late in 
filing his brief in this Court and even failed to file his 
brief within an extension granted him after being informed of 
his default. Supreme Court docket, Cannon v. Keller, No. 
18441, Exhibit D-l. Even an interlocutory appeal which is 
necessary and meritorious must be pursued diligently if not 
expeditiously, and a failure to do so is to be charged 
against the prosecution. Day v. United States, 390 A.2d 957, 
168 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978). 
An additional delay in conducting the preliminary hear-
ing was caused by the prosecutor failing to comply with the 
discovery order, months after this Court upheld the validity 
of that order. (Circuit Court docket, R-4-5). Although this 
additional delay was short, one week, it is indicitative of 
the county attorney's stubborness and indifference to the 
speedy trial right of the defendant. 
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It is submitted that the fifty-one month delay occa-
sioned by the prosecutor's unnecessary, meritless and dila-
tory efforts to evade and delay the discovery order consti-
tuted deliberate and unjustifiable delay which should be 
weighed most heavily against the state. 
3. ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT 
The unusual procedural history of this case made it 
virtually impossible for the defendant to assert his right to 
speedy trial until after the collateral matter was disposed 
of. The prosecutor, by obtaining a stay order ex parte, 
precluded the circuit court from taking any further action. 
The defendant could not demand a trial until he was arraigned 
in district court which could not occur until he was afforded 
a preliminary hearing. After the stay order was lifted, the 
defendant demanded a dismissal in the circuit court because 
of the failure to hold a timely preliminary hearing and 
because of the prosecutor's failure to comply with the disco-
very order (Agreed Statement Supplementing Record, R-205). 
The defendant also gave notice of the speedy trial claim at 
arraignment in district court and filed the motion to dismiss 
for denial of speedy trial. (R-103). 
In State v. Jenkins, 565 P.2d 758, 761 (Ore. 1977), the 
defendant was similarily precluded from asserting a trial 
demand while the prosecution sought to remove the trial judge 
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and the Oregon Supreme Court refused to "read defendant's 
failure to assert his right earlier as acquiescing in the 
delay produced by the state's mandamus petition." 
In United State v. Macino, 486 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1973), 
the court held an unexcused twenty-eight month delay between 
arrest and indictment to be a violation of the sixth amend-
ment despite the fact that the defendants did not make known 
their desire for speedy trial until after indictment. The 
court noted that a defendant cannot be expected to demand a 
trial before he is held to answer. 
It is submitted that the defendant was precluded from 
asserting his right to speedy trial by being held under 
accusation and without preliminary hearing in violation of 
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, as argued in Point 
I of this Brief. Under these circumstances, the defendant 
must be found to have asserted the right as soon as reason-
able . 
4. PREJUDICE 
In Moore v. Arizona, 414- U.S. 25 (1973) the Supreme Court 
held that it was "fundamental error" to interpret Barker v. Wingo, 
supra, as requiring a showing of prejudice to establish a federal 
speedy trial claim. "Prejudice to the defendant is merely one 
of the factors to be balanced in evaluating the reasons for the 
delay and whether the state made a diligent, good-faith effort 
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to bring the defendant to trial." 414 U.S. at 26. 
The Supreme Court in Moore also held: 
Moreover, prejudice to a defendant caused by 
delay in bringing him to trial is not confined to 
the possible prejudice to his defense in those pro-
ceedings. Inordinate delay, 
"wholly aside from possible prejudice to 
a defense on the merits, may 'seriously 
interfere with the defendant's liberty, 
whether he is free on bail or not, and 
. . . may disrupt his employment, drain 
his financial resources, curtail his asso-
ciations, subject him to public obloquy, 
and create anxiety in him, his family and 
his friends.' United States v. Marion, 
404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). These factors 
are more serious for some than for others, 
but they are inevitably present in every 
case to some extent, for every defendant 
will either be incarcerated pending trial 
or on bail subject to substantial restric-
tions on his liberty." Barker v. Wingo, 
supra, at 537 (WHITE, J., concurring). 
414 U.S. at 26-27. 
The Supreme Court identified the interests protected by 
the Sixth Amendment speedy trial clause in United States v. 
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (emphasis added): 
Inordinate delay between arrest, indictment, and 
trial may impair a defendant's ability to present an 
effective defense. But the major evils protected 
against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite 
apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accu-
sed's defense. To legally arrest and detain, the 
Government must assert probable cause to believe the 
arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public 
act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's 
liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that 
may disrupt his employment, drain his financial 
resources, curtail his associations, subject him to 
public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family 
and his friends. 
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And, in United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982), the 
Supreme Court went on to distinguish the "prejudice to the 
defendant" to be analyzed under the Wingo speedy trial test 
from the "prejudice to the defense" to be evaluated in Fifth 
Amendment due process claims involving delay: 
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is 
thus not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to 
the defense caused by passage of time; that interest 
is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and 
statutes of limitation. The speedy trial guarantee 
is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy 
incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, 
but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty 
imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to 
shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and 
the presence of unresolved criminal charges. 
456 U.S. at 8. 
If the information had been dismissed without prejudice 
while the prosecutor in the instant case litigated his colla-
teral case as this Brief argues it should have been, then the 
Sixth Amendment right of an accused to a speedy trial would 
not be involved and the defendant would have to demonstrate 
that the delay resulted in a denial of due process by 
demonstrating "prejudice to his defense." But, the defendant 
here was under accusation for the entire fifty-one months and 
the delay itself prejudiced his right to have a speedy trial 
of the accusation, whether or not the result of the trial was 
affected. As stated in United State v.Machino, 486 F.2d 750, 
753 (7th Cir. 1973): 
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Several things need be mentioned concerning 
the extent of the delay. The delay in the instant 
case is not insubstantial amounting as it does to 
nearly two and one-half years. However, as the 
Barker opinion points out several elements are invol-
ved in the concept of delay. It can, on the one hand 
be viewed merely as the "triggering mechanism" which 
precipitates a speedy trial issue. Viewed as such, 
its significance in the balance is not great. On 
the other hand, delay is inextricably tied to the 
question of prejudice. As the length of the delay 
extends, the more certain prejudice is to result. 
It is manifest that prejudice, always a difficult 
thing to ascertain, must, at some point, be presumed 
to result from an inordinate delay in bringing a defen-
dant to trial. Exactly where that point lies on the 
spectrum of pretrial delay is uncertain, but it is 
clear that the longer the delay, the heavier the 
weight to be given it in the balance. 
In the district court below the defendant demonstrated 
some affirmative prejudice to the defense case due to the 
fuzziness of the memories of the. witnesses at the preliminary 
hearing, the transcript of which was published. (Trans., 
Motion to Quash, April 2, 1985, at 2; R-123). 
However, in this case, the prejudice primarily was to 
the right to not be under accusation and have liberty res-
trained for an unjustifiably long period of time without 
trial. 
The defendant in his argument to the district court 
pointed out an additional prejudicial element created by 
shifting attitudes toward particular offenses over a long 
period of time. In 1980 cocaine was regarded as a recrea-
tional drug similar to marijuana and many of the district 
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court judges in Salt Lake County regarded the distribution of 
cocaine as being more mala prohibita than mala in se. As the 
evil social consequences and addictive nature of cocaine 
became more apparent over the past five year, the judges and 
parole authorities have taken a much stronger punitive atti-
tude toward the offense. The result is that the defendant 
here will suffer agrandizement of actual punishment because 
the prosecution delayed the determination of his case. 
As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Barker 
v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 519, society also has an 
interest in a speedy trial. It is manifest that the value of 
both specific and general deterrence dissipates with time and 
that the public's interest in a speedy trial has also suf-
fered in this case. While it is true that dismissal of the 
prosecution against this defendant cannot restore the damage 
to the public interest in this case, it can protect the 
public interest in speedy trials generally by reminding prose-
cutors it is their primary duty to prosecute cases, not win 
collateral arguments with circuit court judges. 
5. BALANCING THE FACTORS 
It is submitted that the inordinately long delay in this 
case with the resultant severe infringement of the right to 
speedy trial cannot be justified by any legitimate interest 
of the state or excused by factors beyond the control of the 
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prosecution. The prosecutor made a deliberate choice to stay 
the proceedings, ex parte, in order to pursue a meritless 
collateral claim that had no real importance and thus 
deserves no weight in the balance. 
The delay was particularly prejudicial since, occuring 
before preliminary hearing, and resulting from a blanket stay 
order, it precluded the defendant from demanding a trial. 
While dismissal with prejudice is an "unsatisfactorily 
extreme remedy," it also is "the only possible remedy" where 
the specific constitutional right to a speedy trial has been 
violated. Barker v. Wingo, supra, 714 U.S. at 522. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Since the four year period of the statute of limitations 
has run, the proper remedy is the same regardless of whether 
the Court finds the matter should be reversed because of the 
denial of the right to a prompt preliminary hearing or 
because of the denial of the right to a speedy trial. 
Accordingly, the appellant prays that the judgment and convic-
tion be reversed and the information filed against appellant 
be dismissed with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted this 
2£>^L day of September, 1985. 
>fOHN D. O'CONNELL 
^Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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